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ABSTRACT
Evidence is the key to solve any crime. Evidence integrity needs to be protected in order to make
it admissible in the court of law. Digital evidence is more revealing, but it is fragile; it can easily
be tampered with or modified. There are different techniques available to protect the integrity of
digital evidence. Different automated digital evidence acquisition tools are available in the market.
In this paper, we have analyzed two automated tools (EnCase and FTK Imager) that are used for
disk imaging. These tools claim to protect the integrity of digital evidence. The techniques used
by these tools are analyzed in this paper. Problems with their approaches are discussed and a
solution is proposed to address the problems. A prototype of an automated tool is developed with
an implementation of the proposed solution.
Keywords: Digital evidence, integrity, chain of custody, digital hash, digital signature, disk
imaging

INTRODUCTION
Generally, when a crime is committed,
evidence is collected from the crime scene. The
criminal is identified after the examination and
analysis of the evidence. In order to prosecute
the criminal, a court requires sound evidence.
If integrity of the evidence presented in court
could not be proved then it becomes
inadmissible. If there is even a doubt that the
evidence could have been tampered with then
its integrity becomes questionable. If there is
some period of time when the evidence could
have been mishandled or it could have been in
the custody of an unauthorized person, its
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integrity is doubted. From the time of
collection of the evidence till the prosecution of
the case, evidence integrity must be kept
sound and its chain of custody must also be
made tamperproof.
A former Xerox engineer, Larry Benedict,
45, was sentenced to four years in prison by a
federal judge. He was accused of trafficking in
child pornography. All the evidence in this
case was electronic. Larry Benedict hired a
computer expert who found evidence that
pointed towards his innocence. It was found
that all the evidence presented in court was
Page 121
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allegedly tampered with or otherwise altered
after it was in government custody (“Electronic
evidence anchors porn case - CNET,” n.d.). In
another case, Jodi Arias in Arizona was
arrested and found guilty of murder of Travis
Alexander. She was sentenced to death. She
hired a computer forensics expert to examine
the victim computer. It was found that
thousands of files were deleted from the
computer while it was in the custody of Mesa
police department (“Did Mesa Police Botch
The Arias Case?,” n.d.). The problem of
corruption
exists
worldwide
and
law
enforcement agencies are not an exception to
that. The need of protection and preservation
of digital evidence during the extraction phase
is emphasized in the paper (Saleem, Popov, &
Bagilli, 2014). It is also emphasized in the
IOEC’s guidelines (Enfsi, 2009). In order to
minimize human interaction and subjectivity,
it is important to automate the system for
preservation of digital evidence integrity and
its chain of custody.
Digital evidence is fragile in nature and it
is handled differently. The process of collection
and archiving digital evidence is outlined in
RFC3227 (Brezinski & Killalea, 2002). Many
tools have been developed to aid forensic
examiners in gathering and preserving digital
evidence. These tools use message digest to
ensure integrity of the digital evidence. Only
message digest is not enough to guarantee the
integrity of the digital evidence (Lee, Kim,
Lee, & Lim, 2005), because it can easily be
forged. Authors (Aoki, Guo, Matusiewicz,
Sasaki, & Wang, 2009) (Robshaw, 1996) (Xie,
Liu, & Feng, 2006) (Wang, Yin, & Yu, 2005)
(Wang & Yu, 2005) describe some of the
methods to forge integrity.
The PIDESC Model (Saleem & Popov,
2011) provides a solution to deal with the
problem in message digests but it ignores the
protection of the chain of custody. Not only
the evidence, but also the chain of custody
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needs to be protected and made tamperproof.
There is need of a method that can ensure not
only protection of the digital evidence
integrity, but also preservation of the digital
chain of custody.
This paper consists of seven sections,
including references. The current section
explains the problem that needs to be solved.
Second and third sections discuss digital
evidence integrity protection techniques
currently being used and their shortcomings.
Then in the fourth section, our solution is
explained. The fifth section is based on the
analysis and comparison of our solution with
the currently present solutions. Section six
gives conclusion and future directions. The last
section is composed of references.

CURRENT PRACTICES
FOR DIGITAL
EVIDENCE
INTEGRITY
PROTECTION
In this section, we will discuss the techniques
that are used by FTK Imager (“Product
Download,” 2014) and Encase (Guidance
Software, 2016) to protect digital evidence
integrity.

Integrity Protection by FTK
Imager
FTK Imager is a disk imaging tool. It can be
used for imaging of logical drives as well as
physical drives.
It supports four different
formats to store the extracted image. These
formats are AD1, E01, RAW and SMART.
Digital evidence integrity is ensured by
calculating MD5 and SHA1 hashes of the
extracted content and storing it in a report
along with other details related to the drive. It
also offers an encryption feature to ensure the
confidentiality of the digital evidence. The
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digital evidence can be encrypted by using a
password or a digital certificate.
The documentation of FTK Imager
recommends using “Write Blocking Hardware”
so that digital evidence contents are not
changed during the data extraction phase.

Integrity Protection by
Encase
Encase is a forensics tool and it is used to
extract an image of the whole drive. The
extracted image is stored in E01 format.
Integrity of the extracted contents is ensured
by generating CRC and digital hashes (MD5
and SHA1). It also provides an optional
feature of encryption to ensure the
confidentiality of the extracted contents.
Just like FTK Imager, Encase recommends
using “Write Blocking Hardware.”

SHORTCOMINGS OF
CURRENT PRACTICES
In this section, we will discuss the problems
with the practices used by the FTK Imager
and Encase.

Problems with FTK Imager
There are a few points that need to be
addressed in the approach used by the FTK
Imager. Firstly, there is no functionality
present in it that can verify or authenticate
the person who is extracting the forensic
image. Anyone can enter the name of anyone
else as a forensic examiner and extract the
image. There is no way of knowing that
evidence was, indeed, extracted by an
authorized person. So, there is a big question
on the soundness of the evidence. Secondly,
integrity of the evidence is provided through
hashes. Hashes are not enough to guarantee
the integrity of the evidence. If contents of the
evidence are modified and hashes are
recalculated and stored, then the changes in
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the evidence will go undetected. This again
makes the integrity of the evidence
questionable. If encryption is used then it
becomes difficult for the modifications to go
undetected but still possible (Saleem & Popov,
2011).

Problems with Encase
Just like the FTK Imager, Encase does not
provide any functionality to verify or
authenticate the person who is extracting the
forensic image. So, there is no way of knowing
who actually extracted the evidence that
makes integrity of the evidence questionable.
Encase uses MDCs to provide integrity, but
MDCs are not enough to ensure the integrity
and can be forged. In (Saleem & Popov, 2011),
it is discussed in detail that how can MDCs be
forged and even using encryption with MDCs
does not guarantee the integrity.
Both the FTK Imager and the Encase
claim to ensure the integrity of digital
evidence, but the techniques used by these
tools leave the evidence integrity questionable.
Moreover, these tools do not offer any
functionality that can enforce chain of custody
preservation.

PROPOSED SOLUTION
It is evident from above that digital hash or
MDCs alone are not enough to guarantee the
integrity of digital evidence. Storing passwords
or digital keys on local systems is not a safe
approach because if an unauthorized person
gets access to the system, then he or she could
compromise the passwords or digital keys.
Using smart cards to store the digital
credentials is one of the best approaches, as it
securely stores the digital keys or passwords
(Smartcard Alliance & Alliance, 2014). We
propose to use smart cards to store private
keys of forensics examiners and to generate
digital signatures to ensure the integrity of the
digital evidence. This approach will make the
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contents tamperproof and as private keys are
unique, the forensic examiner can be verified as
well.
Our proposed solution is the development
of an automated tool that can ensure the
integrity of digital evidence. It should be able
to not only protect the digital evidence but
also preserve digital chain of custody. In order
to achieve this, we have developed a prototype
of a forensic tool with the following
functionalities and it works in the order
specified below:
1. Authenticate
and
Authorize
the
forensic examiner using smart card
credentials
2. Extracting a bit by bit image of the
whole disk drive containing the
evidence (Our prototype tool only
supports RAW imaging for now. Other
imaging formats like E01, AFF etc. can
also be used instead of RAW format)
3. Creating a digital chain of custody and
appending it to the extracted image
4. Computing hash (SHA1) over the
extracted image and the digital chain of
custody
5. Generating digital signature over the
computed hash by using private key
(RSA-1024 bit) of the forensics
examiner stored in the smart card
6. Appending the generated digital
signature at the end of chain of custody

custody does not get tampered. Integrity of
both the digital evidence and its chain of
custody can be verified. It removes the
possibility of even a single bit being changed in
the extracted evidence, and its digital chain of
custody to go undetected. This can guarantee
the digital evidence integrity and digital chain
of custody preservation.
We have created a simple template for the
digital chain of custody. In our tool, we have
stored the extracted image and its digital chain
of custody in a structure as shown in Figure 1.
The forensic examiner needs to enter the case
number and the evidence number manually.
The rest of the data is inserted automatically
by the tool.
The digital chain of custody consists of two
types of rings; first ring and additional ring.
When the digital evidence is extracted by the
forensic examiner, first ring is added.
Whenever the evidence is handed over to an
authorized person, additional ring is added to
the chain of custody. In the chain of custody
there can be only one first ring, whereas the
number of additional rings depends upon
number of persons to whom the evidence is
handed over. Each handover adds an
additional ring to the chain of custody. First
ring is composed of 1024 bytes, whereas each
additional ring is composed of 512 bytes.
Structure and composition of the rings are
discussed in the subsections.

This approach will ensure that any of the
contents in the evidence or the digital chain of
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First Ring
First ring of the digital chain of custody is
divided into five sections. These sections are of
different sizes. The first and third sections are
of variable size, whereas the second, fourth and
fifth sections are of fixed size as shown in
Figure 2. The details of each section are as
follows.
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Case Information
This section contains information related to
the case. It starts with a four bytes tag, which
in hex is, “10 00 00 00.” The next four bytes
(5th -8th) represents the size of this section in
bytes, including the tag bytes. The next
sixteen bytes (9th- 24th) consist of four sections,
each of which consists of four bytes,
representing the case number field length, the
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evidence number field length, the examiner
name field length and the examiner ID field
length in bytes, in the same order. Structure of
this section is shown in Figure 3.
Disk Geometry
This section contains information about the
geometry of the disk drive whose image is
extracted. It starts with a four bytes tag,
which in hex is, “30 00 00 00.” The next four
bytes (5th -8th) represent the size of this section

Physical Drive Information
This section contains information about the
physical disk drive whose image is extracted. It
starts with a four bytes tag, which in hex is,
“50 00 00 00.” The next four bytes (5th -8th)
represent the size of this section in bytes,
including the tag bytes. The next 16 bytes (9th
– 24th) consist of four sections, each of which
consists of four bytes, representing the drive
model field length, the serial number field
length, the disk interface field length and the
disk size field length in bytes, in the same
order. Structure of this section is shown in
Figure 5.
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in bytes, including the tag bytes. The next four
bytes (9th – 12th) represent the total cylinders
in the disk drive. The four bytes after that
(13th – 16th) represent the tracks per cylinder
in the disk drive. The next four bytes (17th –
20th) represent the sectors per track in the disk
drive. The next eight bytes (21st – 28th)
represent the total number of sectors in the
disk drive. Structure of this section is shown in
Figure 4.

Imaging Information
This section contains information that is
related to the imaging of the disk drive. It
starts with a four bytes tag, which in hex is,
“70 00 00 00.” The next four bytes (5th -8th)
represent the size of this section in bytes,
including the tag bytes. The next eight bytes
(9th – 16th) represent the time when the image
acquisition was started. The next eight bytes
(17th – 24th) represent the time when the image
acquisition was completed. The next sixteen
bytes (25th – 40th) represent the geographical
location of the forensic examiner at the time of
acquisition, where first eight bytes (25th – 32nd)
represent latitude and last eight bytes (33rd –
© 2017 ADFSL
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40th) represent longitude. Structure of this
section is shown in Figure 6.
Digital Signature
The last 128 bytes section contains the digital
signature which is generated via a smart card
using RSA 1024 bit private key of the forensic
examiner.
1024 bytes are reserved for
chain of custody in which first
contain data related to the chain
and the last 128 bytes are for
signature.

the digital
896 bytes
of custody
the digital

Additional Ring
This ring is composed of 512 bytes with a 4
bytes starting tag of “90 00 00 00” in hex. This
ring includes the authorized person’s name,
his/her ID (name and ID are stored in his/her
smart card), time at which the evidence is
handed over, location of the evidence hand
over and his/her digital signature via a smart
card. This digital signature needs to be
calculated over the previous chain of custody
rings and the current ring’s first 384 bytes.
The calculated digital signature is then stored
in last 128 bytes of the current ring.
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evidence and its digital chain of custody. In
terms of time, this approach takes hardly a
second extra than the techniques currently
being used. This added time is for digital
signature generation which takes less than one
second. So, the difference in terms of time is
negligible. In addition to the digital evidence
integrity, our proposed approach preserves the
chain of custody but the current tools do not
offer such functionality. This comparison is
based on the results of the tool that we
developed as a proof of concept to analyze the
proposed approach.

CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The proposed solution is effective and feasible.
It provides not only digital evidence integrity
protection but also the digital chain of custody
preservation. We developed a tool as a proof of
concept with limited functionality to evaluate
our proposed solution. An industrial standard
forensic tool can be developed based on the
concept that we used to develop our tool. The
forensic tool should extract forensic image and
store it in multiple formats, contrary to our
tool that only stores image in RAW format.

ANALYSIS AND
COMPARISON
If we compare the proposed approach to the
approach being used to ensure the integrity of
the digital evidence, then the proposed
approach is undoubtedly the better one. It
rules out doubts about the unauthorized
modification of the evidence; it provides nonrepudiation. It does a better job in protecting
the integrity than the techniques currently
being used. In terms of cost, the proposed
approach costs a little more. The additional
cost is incurred due to the use of smart cards,
which are cheap in price. The added cost is
well justified in terms of the level of trust and
clarity it provides in integrity of digital
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